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What's Good for the Goose Should Also be Good for the Gander I am aware that many of my contentions will appear very ridiculous to those who view the subject from a contrary standpoint, and regard the lower animals as created solely for the pleasure and advantage of man; on the other hand, I have myself derived an unfailing fund of amusement from a rather extensive study of our adversaries' reasoning. It is a conflict of opinion, wherein time alone can adjudicate: but already there are not a few signs that the laugh will rest ultimately with the humanitarians.
1
In 1892 Henry Salt had little doubt that the emerging modern political state had the capacity to strongly protect the interests of animals, so long as the 'humanitarians' had the last laugh. I share his optimism. I am highly suspicious of claims that liberalism is an inherently antianimal framework or that we must look to an entirely new political paradigm to comprehensively protect the interests of animals. Robert Garner may be correct when he claims that the moral orthodoxy places a higher value on toleration of individual moral choice than on the wellbeing of animals, and as such liberal theorists have traditionally denied that the types of strong liberal democratic principles used to protect humans from harm can be applied to animals.
2 But such refusals by orthodox liberal theorists tell us nothing about liberalism per se. They simply tell us how some people have chosen to interpret liberalism at certain points in time. They reveal much more about a particular theorist's personal bias than they do about liberalism as a political framework. Liberal principles have been successfully deployed for the benefit of so many marginal others; others with whom the ruling class did not wish to share the trappings of power. The persistent ability, on the part of advocates for change, to use the pre-existing tools in the liberal toolbox for the benefit of marginal others gives me great hope that liberalism can be deployed in defence of nonhuman animals.
However, therein lies the limitation of the animal protection framework I propose in this book. I cannot purport to offer a solution for all the problems which all animals, in all places, face all of the time. Reform to the external inconsistency would be much more likely to generate that type of outcome as it is not context-dependent. External inconsistency arguments rely on a belief in the primacy of consistency in moral reasoning and an acceptance that species membership is not a morally relevant categorisation. From there it is simply a case of asserting that whatever type of protection is owed human animals the same is also owed to nonhuman animals. By contrast, the principles I put forward in this chapter are intended to apply only to those animals who live among us in liberal democratic political states and who are the subject of complex regulatory instruments, such as anti-cruelty or animal welfare statutes. The agenda I sketch here will not allow us to stand in judgement of the way indigenous people treated animals in the pre-modern era. It will tell us nothing about what we owe mosquitoes and it will not necessarily prepare us for thinking about animals in a post-liberal state. The approach I propose here, however, demonstrates that liberal democratic principles are not engaged when laws are made for captive nonhuman animals. From there I argue that laws created within the context of a liberal democratic political system should adhere to the bedrock principles that differentiate that political system from all others; I then show that if the equity principle were applied to animals we could expect that at least some of the hardships some animals face -in part due to the invisible way in which many animals labour -would be addressed.
The agenda I sketch here is underscored by a belief that there is something problematic about current animal protection arrangements, and, as such, animal use regulation is in need of reform. It is designed to alleviate the problem of the internal inconsistency, while allowing the external inconsistency to remain intact. It does this by asserting that the state should be consistent in the way it regulates the lives of captive animals. However, the consistency referred to here is not the same consistency pro-animal theorists have traditionally sought to engage. In Chapter 1 I argued that when Peter Singer uses the equity principle in his book Animal Liberation, he uses it in a very specific way; to address the problem of the external inconsistency. Singer's 1975 publication set the tone for moral consideration of nonhuman animals
